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SENSIBILITY, SINCERITY, AND SELF-INTEREST IN CHARLOTTE SMITH’S 
ETHELINDE  
 
This essay argues that Charlotte Smith’s little studied novel, “Ethelinde”, 
presents sensibility in a way which complicates the opposition between 
virtuous and corrupt femininity. In this text, Smith breaks down the 
association of sincerity of feeling with virtue by showing how authentic 
emotions could be managed for self-interested purposes. Sensibility in 
“Ethelinde”, therefore, exceeds the logic of sentimentality. I historicize this 
self-interested function of feeling in relation to the work of Gillian Skinner 
and Harriet Guest, who argue that the emergence of political economy 
inflected discourses of feminine feeling with the language of commerce. At 
the same time, I demonstrate that Smith’s mobilization of sensibility 
represents a proto-feminist intervention into the patriarchal order, 
participating in the ideological agenda that Diane Hoeveler has identified 
in women’s gothic literature. Smith’s presentation of feeling as a possible 
mode of agency for women is, however, deeply conflicted, and I suggest this 
might be due to the author’s real-life battles with patriarchal law. In order 
to theorise the ambiguous status of sensibility in the text, I engage with 
Arlie Hoschild’s twentieth-century theory of emotion, which allows an 
articulation feeling in terms that move beyond the familiar constructions of 
feminine virtue and vice.   
 
Keywords: Charlotte Smith; Sensibility; Gothic; Ethelinde; Romantic; Eighteenth 
Century 
 
Kaley Kramer notes “a widespread cultural consensus” in the long eighteenth century which 
held that inner emotional experience was revealed transparently and inadvertently through the 
body,1 and which created a conception of virtuous femininity associated with spontaneously 
expressed emotion (sensibility). At the same time, however, writers voiced concerns that 
“gestures ‘natural’ to virtuous women could be mimicked…by those without virtue in order 
to take advantage of the noble efforts inspired by a performance of virtue-in-distress”.2 
Sympathetic feelings for others could be equally double-edged. Ildiko Csengei draws 
attention to writers who presented sympathy as self-interested, directed only at those who 
could further the feeling subjects own interests.3 Equally, however, “the excess of 
disinterested feeling was seen as threatening to the integrity of self and society”,4 since 
feelings for another could operate “impulsively and irrespective of who their object really 
is”.5 Sympathy could therefore could be both overly selfish and overly altruistic. 
Charlotte Smith’s interventions into the discourses of feeling in the Romantic period 
have been remarked upon several critics.6 Most relevant to present discussion is the work of 
Claire Knowles and Sarah M. Zimmerman, who highlight the blend of sincere and staged 
emotions apparent in Smith’s sonnets.7 This essay turns the attention to Smith’s early novel 
Ethelinde (1789), to demonstrate how the staging of sensibility structures the logic of social 
relationships in the text, raising questions about the nature of emotions, about sincerity and 
manipulation, and about gender.   
Drawing on the work of Harriet Guest and Gillian Skinner, I argue that sensibility in 
Smith’s novel both conforms to and exceeds its culturally defined parameters. Sensibility in 
Ethelinde ostensibly validates feminised conceptions of virtuous feeling and yet also disrupts 
these conventions through its representation of exploitative and profiteering strategies of 
feeling. Further, I argue that the contradictions in Smith’s presentation of sensibility can be 
productively located in the tradition of female-authored gothic literature theorised by Diane 
Long Hoeveler. When considered in relation to Hoeveler’s thesis, the ambiguities in Smith’s 
presentation of gendered feeling can be seen as semi-covertly disrupting patriarchal authority. 
This is achieved by presenting women’s sensibility and passivity as, paradoxically, a 
proactive social force which moulds men and reality to suit female needs. This move towards 
women’s empowerment, however, is deeply conflicted: it offers a form of female agency that 
resists male authority, but it remains extremely sceptical about the desirability of the 
strategies it suggests. 
To pursue these two lines of argument, I draw on Arlie Hoschild’s twentieth-century 
study of emotional labour in The Managed Heart: The Commercialization of Human 
Feeling.8 Putatively a critique of how capitalism exploits the emotional resources of service 
workers, most thoroughly examined in relation to U.S air hostesses in the 1970s and 80s, 
Hoschild’s research also offers a useful theoretical framework with which to interrogate 
strategies of feeling in Ethelinde. This is because Hoschild’s theory adds nuance to the 
familiar language of repressed emotions, enabling greater insight into the different feeling 
strategies of the text’s characters, particularly regarding the differences in feeling between the 
text’s eponymous heroine and her cousin-in-law and male guardian, Sir Edward Newenden. 
Both these characters are associated with virtuous sensibility inasmuch as their feeling is not 
simulated and operates on appropriate objects but, I argue, their modes of feeling actually 
have important aspects in common with corrupt sensibility which cannot be fully articulated 
in terms familiar to the sentimental tradition.  
Key to Hoschild’s argument is the notion that emotions are not straightforward 
responses to external stimuli, but rather a process over which the feeling subject has 
considerable control: we might think of a person who tries to enjoy a social event they would 
rather not attend, for example, and who is so successful that they do actually enjoy 
themselves. Hoschild labels this as “direct prod deep acting”, which means to actively 
attempt to summon or repress an emotion for social purposes. In Smith’s novel, I argue that 
direct prod deep acting is the method of emotional management which most strongly 
characterises Sir Edward. In contrast, Ethelinde does not so much repress or summon 
emotions as she does manipulate social encounters so that her spontaneous emotional 
response is seen in the most productive light. In both the cases of Sir Edward and Ethelinde, 
the feelings they experience are real rather than simulated, and it is this which marks them as 
virtuous within the logic of sentimentality and sensibility, and yet I aim to show that Smith 
submits this concept of virtuous emotion to a sustained critique. 
Both Skinner and Guest highlight that during the latter half of the eighteenth century 
the construction of femininity became embroiled with political economy, since both women’s 
apparently superior sensibility and commerce were seen to civilise the manners of men. 
Because of this, the discourses of sensibility and femininity became unstable and ambiguous, 
frequently traced, whether consciously or unconsciously, by the logic of exchange. 9   
Hoschild’s work allows for a productive engagement with these ideas, as well as those of 
Hoeveler. For Hoschild, peoples’ actions in the social economy are regulated by their sense 
of what is owed between people. From the simple repayment of a kind word with a smile, to 
the complex systems of felt obligations and returns generated by the mode of production, all 
interaction within the social economy is embedded in an understanding of credit and debt. 
Credit and debt for its part can exist in both material and psychological form. One may repay 
a friend for his or her concern over a problem (emotional credit being granted) with a gift of 
jewellery (material debt repayment). 
Hoschild, however, does not conceive of the social economy purely in terms of 
mutual benefits. For example, where there is inequality of status between people, “it becomes 
acceptable to both parties for the bottom dog to contribute more” (84) to the relationship in 
the form of greater value gifts. Because Hoschild’s thought allows for inequality in emotional 
exchange, it is differentiated from sentimental relationships conceived in terms “of a mutual 
obligation which is equally pleasurable on both sides” (Skinner 131). Through this, 
Hoschild’s theory allows for an elaboration of sensibility in Ethelinde which emphasises 
social profiteering rather than disinterested benevolence, and which is in some ways better 
articulated in the language of commerce than of sentimentality, and suggestive of an 
amalgamation of discourses of between feeling and political economy. 
At the same time, Hoschild’s social economy converges with Hoeveler’s analysis in 
its emphasis on credit and debt. Hoeveler argues that for women in the female-authored 
gothic/sentimental tradition “suffering (particularly if one is young and pretty) can become a 
kind of lucre to be exchanged in the strange barter system that women understood (or 
misunderstood) as the ‘shadow labor’ of gendered capitalism”.10 Through Hoschild’s social 
economy, I show that sensibility operates along similar lines as suffering does in Hoeveler’s 
analysis. More precisely, sensibility in Ethelinde can be sold for a profit, realised in terms of 
male financial and social support. It is in this that Smith’s novel works-out a possible mode 
of agency for women through feeling and within patriarchy, and it is here that the ambiguous 
status of sensibility identified by Skinner and Guest aligns with the strategies characteristic of 
the gothic heroine. 
To go further, it is necessary to outline the plot of Ethelinde. Ethelinde is left 
orphaned and indigent after her father dies of acute anxiety brought on by financial ruin.11 
Because Montgomery, her love-interest, is also poor, Ethelinde refuses to marry him until the 
couple secure the means of (genteel) subsistence. The story of Ethelinde is in one sense the 
story of her social management in enabling a prudent marriage to Montgomery. 12 To do this, 
Ethelinde requires the support – financial and social – of her wealthy and socially connected 
cousin-in-law, Sir Edward Newenden. 
Sir Edward, although married to Ethelinde’s cousin, Lady Newenden, is deeply in 
love with Ethelinde. Ethelinde firmly denies this to be the case until very late in the story, and 
although the text makes plain Sir Edward’s feelings, Ethelinde is frequently presented by the 
narrator as being ignorant of Sir Edward’s desires.13 Nevertheless, sustained evidence to the 
contrary convinces the reader otherwise. The libertine Lord Danesforte thinks Ethelinde is 
“not insensible” of Sir Edward’s “partiality” (29). Similarly, exasperated by Sir Edward’s 
inappropriate behaviour towards Ethelinde, Lady Newenden flirts with Danesforte by way of 
revenge, and when confronted by Sir Edward publicly proclaims that Sir Edward’s 
accusations are only “to hide his own odious and infamous partiality” to Ethelinde (159). As 
the story progresses, Sir Edward becomes increasingly indiscrete, drawing the suspicions of 
not only Lord Danesforte and Lady Newenden, but also of Lady Newenden’s parents, 
Montgomery, and polite society at large. Finally, in a rare few moments the narrator tacitly 
admits that Ethelinde is aware of the romantic significance of Sir Edward’s behaviour, such 
as when Ethelinde’s “heart told her” (292) that Sir Edward saw her “with too much partiality” 
(292). At other times, Ethelinde’s innocence is discredited more generally, such as when the 
narrator states that she is “incapable of artifice” (319) only to almost immediately explain her 
plan to secretly have a copy of a miniature portrait of herself made, so that both Sir Edward 
and Montgomery may possess a picture of her, while also making each believe that only they 
have been honoured with the romantically freighted gift. 
Kramer points out that the heroine of sensibility is unable “to detect personal danger, 
particularly sexual threats. She must be…unable to dissimulate, but equally unable to 
distinguish lies from truth. Paradoxically, the heroine of sensibility must be ignorant of the 
skills in which she shows the most proficiency”.14 Ethelinde, I am arguing, complicates the 
paradigm. The heroine combines genuine sincerity of feeling with self-conscious 
manipulation through feeling. For much of the text, her sensibility conforms precisely to the 
virtuous understandings of the concept outlined earlier, as well as aligns her with the generic 
conventions of the heroine of sensibility. And yet at times her feeling exceeds the category of 
feminine virtue in ways which often cannot be accounted for by the discourses of sensibility 
and sympathy prevalent in the period. 
Early in the story, the rich libertine-in-training Davenant proposes to Ethelinde. At the 
time, Ethelinde’s father and brother are absent, and as such she is lacking in the traditional 
channels of male protection. Instead, she turns to Sir Edward to reject Davenant for her. Sir 
Edward, however, has not yet fully understood the danger posed by Davenant, incorrectly 
believing that he will turn out to be reasonably virtuous. As such, Sir Edward is ambivalent 
about Ethelinde’s instant refusal of Davenant’s offer of marriage, and tries to persuade her to 
consider the matter a little more, and to speak to him herself: 
 
“There is another person, however, whom you ought to see: Davenant 
has repeated his wish to be allowed to speak to you”. 
“Dear Sir Edward”, answered Ethelinde with increased quickness, 
“how can you be so importunate about that young man! Indeed I can 
never like him; I can never esteem him; why then should him a 
moment to be in doubt about my sentiments?” 
“Then why not hear and dismiss him, if to dismiss him you are 
determined?”. (81) 
 
By keeping the proposal in the hands of Sir Edward Ethelinde maintains a level of male 
protection. Talking to Davenant herself could expose her to gossip, charges of coquetry, or be 
construed by Davenant as encouragement. Even so, there is a sense in this passage that 
Ethelinde is unfair to Sir Edward. In the first instance, she had previously promised Sir 
Edward she would speak to Davenant herself, but instead continues to position him as the 
middle-man in the affair. Sir Edward, in fact, feels deeply uncomfortable in the situation, 
telling Davenant it “‘is a commission which you know I did not wish to undertake. It will be 
fitter for you to speak to her yourself’” (70). Moreover, Ethelinde’s response seems to exceed 
proper feminine virtue. Her “increased quickness” and the following tirade of speech gesture 
towards excess rather than delicacy, denoting spontaneous wilfulness and exasperation at the 
possibility of not getting her own way. Maintaining both the male protection authorised by 
late eighteenth century society as well as appropriate feminine behaviour here seems 
impossible. 
Ethelinde’s immediately following response to the scene described above is 
illuminating:       
 
“Dear Sir Edward, press me no more on this subject; and forgive – 
forgive the ungrateful petulance with which I have received your 
friendly but impracticable advice”. She then gave him her hand; while 
her eyes, filled with tears, were fixed on his face. He found himself 
too much affected; and not daring to trust his own resolutions, he only 
kissed her hand, and said, with as much steadiness as he could 
command – “You will always command me, Ethelinde; you know 
that I have no wish but to see you happy”. (81) 
 
Here Ethelinde acknowledges the “petulance” of her previous statement and humbly asks for 
forgiveness, yet her apology does far more than merely excuse a social slip. The image here 
presents “emotion in tableau” (Todd 4), characteristic of the novel of sensibility. The novel of 
sensibility stops the story to display “physical manifestations of tears and trembling”, which 
are believed to elicit similar responses in the reader, and “justified by the belief that a 
heightened sense of one’s virtue through pity for another is morally improving (Todd 8).   
Ethelinde’s sensibility therefore works on the assumption that such a display of 
feeling generates powerful emotional responses in others. And, at least for Sir Edward, this is 
what occurs. The realisation of Ethelinde’s sensibility here is sufficient to ensure that Sir 
Edward continues to protect her from the unwanted attentions of Davenant, his previous 
misgivings seemingly forgotten along with the petulance of Ethelinde’s behaviour. Moreover, 
in stating that he has no wish but to make Ethelinde happy, Sir Edward alludes to the 
excessive financial and social support he will provide the heroine for the rest of the story, to 
the detriment of his wife’s well-being, his marriage, and his own emotional health (as I 
demonstrate later). 
Considered thus, the scene cannot be adequately understood by the codes of 
sentimentality. The expression of sensibility here does not create shared and mutually 
beneficial solidarity; it rather stacks emotional, social, and financial resources in favour of the 
heroine. Because of this, I think the scene can be more productively articulated according to 
Hoschild’s social economy. Hoschild argues that social situations are regulated by “feeling 
rules”; that is, unwritten rules which require us to feel in certain ways in specific situations. 
For example, we are expected to feel sadness at a funeral. But feeling rules do not only apply 
to ceremonial events such as funerals. In fact, they apply to all social intercourse. When 
Ethelinde responds with “increasing quickness” (81) she breaks the feeling rule, since she is 
expected to feel greater gratitude to Sir Edward, and more awareness of how he might be 
feeling, than she does. Seen thus, Ethelinde has put herself in Sir Edward’s debt according to 
the logic of exchange through which Hoschild understands the social economy. It is precisely 
Ethelinde’s sensibility, however, which allows her to not only repay the debt, but actually 
position herself as the creditor in the relationship. Through the spontaneous remorse 
expressed both in her words and through her body, with interest added in the form of the 
sensuous kiss of the hands, Ethelinde settles her account and puts an unspoken demand on Sir 
Edward, which he can only pay-off through his continued socio-economic support. 
Sensibility in this scene is more about individual profiteering than it is about shared support. 
At the same time, however, because the scene aligns Ethelinde with the expectations 
of the heroine of sensibility it codes her on a generic level as virtuous. Twenty-first century 
readers are unlikely to experience the potent emotional response expected from such scenes 
by many long eighteenth century theorists, authors, and readers, but we can certainly 
recognise the tableau operating according to these assumptions. As such, the imagined 
Romantic-period reader is subjected to an assault on his or her feelings which parallels the 
one experienced by Sir Edward, and which encourages the reader, along with Sir Edward, to 
overlook any transgression of feminine propriety apparent in Ethelinde’s behaviour. In this 
sequence, therefore, the putative conformity to the logic of sensibility conceals the heroine’s 
transgression of this very logic. 
Furthermore, even when the logic of social profiteering which underwrites sensibility 
in this episode is acknowledged, the feelings of Ethelinde cannot be easily aligned with the 
negative or corrupt determinations of feeling identified by Kramer or Csengei. As the natural 
expression of her genuine feelings of shame, it is opposed to the simulation of emotions by 
scheming women eager to exploit male chivalry. Directed at Sir Edward, it is representative 
of sympathetic feelings towards an appropriate male guardian. Sensibility in this instance 
exceeds its cultural categorisations. It is both sincere and appropriately feminine, and yet 
caught-up with ideas of individualistic self-interest.  
Consider another example. After having met Montgomery and his mother, Ethelinde 
wishes to further their interests through Sir Edward. Suspicious and jealous of Ethelinde’s 
feelings for Montgomery, Sir Edward questions Ethelinde in the hope of gaining information. 
This is how the experiment plays out: 
 
Ethelinde then, unable to resist the pleasure of talking of Montgomery 
and his mother, and secretly flattering herself that she should create a 
friend for them in the noble-minded and generous Sir Edward, 
related, in as few words as she could, the outline of their 
history…[and] the vivacity with which she spoke, the animation of 
her countenance, and the warmth of her expressions, convinced Sir 
Edward, who watched her narrowly, that the young man had made an 
impression on her heart...The pang this conviction gave to his own, he 
immediately endeavoured to suppress; and yielding to his natural 
generosity, he became really interested for the mother and the son. 
(69) 
 
Speaking about Montgomery activates Ethelinde’s genuine feelings for him, which are 
apparent to Sir Edward because of “the vivacity with which she spoke, the animation of her 
countenance, and the warmth of her expressions” (69). Her emotions are therefore expressed 
naturally through the body in line with the culturally valorised experience of sensibility. 
There is no reason to believe that Ethelinde’s feelings are simulated here. After all, her 
romantic and platonic love for Montgomery and his mother, respectively, forms the main 
drive of the story, and is insisted upon time and time again. Moreover, Smith creates several 
textual foils which are narrated to show the insincerity of their emotions (Lady Newenden, 
Clarinthia Ludford, Lady Belle), and these characters function precisely to highlight the 
sincerity of Ethelinde’s own emotions.  
And yet once again the heroine’s apparent alignment with virtuous sensibility 
becomes ambiguous. The narrator in this passage informs the reader that Ethelinde secretly 
flattered “herself that she should create a friend” (69) for Montgomery and his mother “in the 
noble-minded and generous Sir Edward” (69), adding an element of strategic self-interest to 
the spontaneous experience of emotion. Ethelinde’s feeling here is both sincere and guided by 
hidden, ulterior motives; at once conforming to a virtuous conception of sensibility while 
simultaneously subverting the ideal of disinterested feeling which creates the moral bonds of 
sentimentality. 
Moreover, sympathy in this episode, as well as sensibility, seems to emphasise self-
interest more than it does spontaneous benevolence. In particular, it aligns in important ways 
with the thought of Adam Smith. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith argues 
sympathy for another “does not arise so much” from the knowledge of misfortune or 
suffering itself “as from that of the situation which excites it”.15 That is, it is less the actual 
suffering of a person which excites sympathy and more the knowledge of the particular 
circumstances which led to their suffering, an argument seemingly borne out in the text by 
the activation of Sir Edward’s sympathetic feelings for Montgomery only after Ethelinde 
conveys his particular story. Similarly, for Adam Smith sympathy occurs through the 
“imaginary spectator”, a function of mind which allows the individual to put him or herself in 
the position of another (The Theory of Moral Sentiments). Because of this, and as Todd points 
out, sympathy in Adam Smith is seen “less as a spontaneous than as a contrived mode” (27), 
and as such is at odds with the ideal of spontaneous feeling which constitutes the sentimental 
narrative. Adam Smith’s line of thought squares quite firmly with the manner in which Sir 
Edward does not immediately experience sympathy for Montgomery, but rather achieves 
benevolent feelings through an emotional process in which he must “supress” his jealousy 
and “yield to his natural generosity”. 
This mode of sympathy is ultimately selfish, both in Adam Smith’s philosophy and in 
Charlotte Smith’s novel. In terms of the former, Chris Jones notes that sympathy, for Adam 
Smith, is based not on disinterested benevolence but rather on the individual’s need to feel 
loved (30). That is, through sympathetic feelings people are able to satisfy their innate desire 
to feel loved by others, thereby coding sympathy as, at heart, a selfish human function. As 
Skinner argues, Adam Smith’s later and more influential The Wealth of Nations enacts a 
“gradual honing down of ‘sympathy’ until the quality becomes almost indistinguishable from 
middle-class self-interest” (13). By the time of the publication of Ethelinde, then, sympathy 
in Adam Smith’s work had become almost entirely structured through rational selfishness. 
This notion of selfish feeling is also apparent in Sir Edward feelings for Ethelinde. 
Because Sir Edward is married, and because he is too virtuous to “‘entertain any other 
designs’” (41); that is, to consider having an affair with Ethelinde, the only outlet for his 
desire is in supporting Ethelinde. The reader is told that “in her [Ethelinde’s] absence his [Sir 
Edward’s] thoughts dwelt perpetually on the means of making her happy” (94); and even 
more explicitly, Sir Edward, “deprived of almost all other happiness, found his greatest 
consolation in contributing to the ease and relief of Ethelinde” (97). Seen as such, Sir 
Edward’s will to aid Montgomery and his mother, the painful sensations he experiences 
notwithstanding, represent, in the final analysis, a selfish need to satisfy his romantic and 
sexual desire, sublimated into the sentimental narrative of male protection. The logic of 
emotional exchange between Ethelinde and Sir Edward is predicated, therefore, as much on 
self-interest and rational feeling as it is on the spontaneous expression of emotion also 
inherent in Ethelinde’s bodily expression of sensibility.   
Todd argues that “throughout the 1780s and 1790s...Clear sentimentalists degrade 
sentiment, and sentimental novelists claim not to be writing sentimental novels” (144), 
resulting in “decidedly schizophrenic” (144) texts which seem at once to endorse and refute 
sensibility. The apparent contradictory nature of sensibility in Ethelinde certainly aligns with 
this shift in attitudes towards the traditions of sentimentality and sensibility. Similarly, 
Guest’s and Skinner’s arguments concerning the links between political economy and 
feminine sensibility goes some to way to explaining the contamination of sensibility with the 
logic of exchange in Ethelinde. Guest argues that “for women to think of themselves as 
modern subjects” means acknowledging their “desires are structured and articulated as those 
of commercial agents and political citizens” (312). Because the language of sensibility is 
associated with domestic femininity on the one hand, and yet also implicated in commercial 
discourse on the other, it provides women with the means of creating modern subjectivities in 
a way apparently congruent with feminine virtue. It is this, I think, which allows Smith to 
articulate the social profiteering of Ethelinde through the terminology of sensibility. Smith’s 
aim in doing this, I think, is to express deep resentment about patriarchy, and about what an 
indigent woman must do to survive. Before exploring this in detail, I would like to briefly 
turn to the specific historical situation of Charlotte Smith herself, since this appears to have 
focussed the contradictions in Ethelinde and made them particularly self-conscious of their 
apparent ambiguities. In relation to this, Sarah Zimmerman’s understanding of the mixing of 
“self-consciousness with sincerity” in Smith’s sonnets is revealing.16 
Zimmerman argues that the sonnets employ rhetorical strategies which emphasise the 
sincerity of the poet’s suffering while at the same time presenting these sufferings in a 
manner best suited to elicit both reader sympathy and active charity. Through this, “Smith 
discovered that she could only act indirectly”, stimulating practical aid without explicitly 
asking for it.17 Indeed, this strategy was so successful that “Readers, including patrons and 
critics, were often glad to act for her, and Smith received generous assistance from 
publishers…, and from various patrons throughout her career”.18 
Ethelinde’s emotional strategies, I would argue, operate along similar lines to Smith’s 
management of her publicly available sensibility. By sublimating the active search for 
practical assistance into feminine sensibility, Ethelinde maximises the socio-financial rewards 
she can expect. Just as with Smith’s critics and publishers, Sir Edward is persuaded to offer 
more than mere sympathy: he spends money and exerts his social influence to aid Ethelinde, 
her family, and Montgomery. Just as Smith was able to self-consciously present her feeling to 
secure practical assistance, so too is her heroine Ethelinde. It is because of this the real-world 
context, I think, that the ambiguities in Ethelinde appear to be to some degree contrived, 
rather than as the pure result of aesthetic devices concealing ideological functions. Jacqueline 
Labbe, in her analysis of Smith’s The Old Manor House argues that “the novel enacts its own 
dependence on and departures from cultural mores and norms, it acquires the ‘meta’ style of 
writing, aware of its own status as text”.19  In Ethelinde, we see this process in relation to the 
discourse of sensibility. This self-awareness of the ambivalence of sensibility is apparent 
throughout the text, and comes through, for example, in the direct acknowledgment by the 
narrator that Ethelinde self-consciously seeks to manipulate Sir Edward into aiding 
Montgomery and his mother in the passage analysed above. Similarly, the earlier cited 
episode in which Ethelinde secretly has a copy of her picture made, so that both Montgomery 
and Sir Edward may possess a likeness, while each believing only they have been favoured 
with the romantically-charged gift, also draws attention to the possible duplicity in apparently 
disinterested emotion.   
I previously stated that sensibility in Ethelinde represents a deep cynicism about 
patriarchy, and this can be understood in relation to what Hoeveler has labelled the 
“professionalization or cultivated pose of femininity” (14) in women’s gothic novels. 
Ethelinde is not a gothic novel in the conventional sense (it does not feature much in the way 
of hidden passages or haunted apartments), yet Smith’s presentation of how Ethelinde 
transforms the world around her, primarily through her emotional resources, does work in 
much the same way as Hoeveler theorises. For Hoeveler, women in these novels must learn 
to temper the perceived excesses of their femininity: “Possessing the mind of a man means 
that women are first and foremost reasonable, calm, and easily able to control or better yet 
repress their emotions” (32). Similarly, men must undergo a parallel curbing of the 
destructive masculine tendencies of “violent, aggressive, lustful, and adulterous” (31) 
behaviour, thereby becoming “feminised”. For the heroines, the control of dangerous 
impulses signals their suitability for inclusion in an emerging bourgeoisie culture of self-
command. For the men, “a man who has been professionally gendered…according to 
bourgeoisie ideology, will not think he can tyrannize over his wife and children” (32), thus 
guaranteeing security for the heroine in the patriarchal system.  
The heroine of female-authored gothic or sentimental texts brings about this idealised 
order not by passively submitting to men, but by understanding “not to trust to the goodwill 
of men but to manipulate or control those men – weakened by their own emotions – without 
those men actually being aware of it” (Hoeveler 33). This seems to resonate strongly with 
Ethelinde’s handling of Sir Edward in both the examples previously discussed. In the first 
example, Ethelinde influences Sir Edward to help her, to offer her his male protection, by 
simply expressing her sensibility, which results in the overcoming of Sir Edward’s own 
tightly-wrought feelings. In the second example, it is the jealous Sir Edward that sets-out to 
manipulate Ethelinde, reasoning (correctly) that his questions will provide insight into 
Ethelinde’s feelings for Montgomery. But the game turns sour as Ethelinde’s expression of 
sensibility leads only to Sir Edward endeavouring to aid Montgomery and, by extension, to 
help enable Ethelinde’s marriage to Montgomery. In both examples, Ethelinde enlists male 
support without seemingly doing much at all, exemplifying what Hoeveler calls “‘wise 
passiveness’, or what we might more accurately recognize as a form of passive-aggression” 
(7).       
I think, however, that the articulation of sensibility in Ethelinde adds nuance to 
Hoeveler’a argument. The mark of the professionally gendered woman, according to 
Hoeveler, is the ability to “to control or better yet repress their emotions” (32), but Ethelinde 
complicates this idea by separating the control of emotions from the carefully managed 
staging of sensibility, questioning the former and valorising the latter. In the second episode 
analysed in detail above, the “pang” of jealousy Sir Edward feels towards Montgomery “he 
immediately endeavoured to suppress” (69, my italics). To repress an emotion is an act of 
emotional labour which, we recall, Hoschild identifies as “direct prod deep acting”. Unlike 
Ethelinde, who does not try to feel a certain way but rather naturally achieves the socially 
appropriate emotional response, Sir Edward’s emotional management requires that he 
actively battle himself to obtain the desired feeling. While Hoschild acknowledges that direct 
prod deep acts are common in everyday life and sometimes successful, they imply a level of 
inauthenticity inasmuch as the subject may experience their emotions as forced or controlled: 
“In deep acting my conscious mental work….keeps the feeling I conjure from being part of 
‘myself’” (36). In both the cases of Ethelinde and Sir Edward the feelings they are experience 
are real (Sir Edward becomes “really interested for mother and son” [69] ), but in Ethelinde’s 
case they flow naturally from her own being, whereas for Sir Edward they are in explicit 
opposition to his spontaneous experience of emotion. The result of Sir Edward’s deep acting, 
of course, is that he ends-up acting for the benefit of the heroine and her husband-to-be. The 
repression of emotion, therefore, would seem to be inferior to the staging of sensibility in 
managing the social economy.  
In a similar vein, Sir Edward’s romantic attraction to Ethelinde results in wilful self-
delusion, revealing his relative inadequacies in managing emotions. This self-delusion is a 
persistent theme in the narrative, but perhaps most clearly demonstrated when Sir Edward 
separates from Lady Newenden. He arrives unexpected at Ethelinde’s residence, stating that 
‘“Lady Newenden is a worthless, a lost, an unprincipled woman’”, that he has “‘left…for 
ever’” (244). Sir Edward insinuates that Lady Newenden has committed adultery, but in fact 
this is not the case at this point in the story. Further, Sir Edward acknowledges that the 
separation will allow him to pursue something that “interests” (245) him: “to be the friend 
and protector” (245) of Ethelinde, clearly illustrating the real motive behind his decision to 
separate. Nevertheless, Sir Edward brushes aside Ethelinde’s requests for specific details, and 
it is quite clear to the reader that through his hyperbolic language, insinuation, and refusal to 
state the plain facts of matter, Sir Edward seeks to delude himself about his motivations.    
Hoschild argues that feeling “has a signal function; it warns us of where we stand vis-
à-vis outer or inner events” (28). In a similar way to the senses, emotions enable people to 
interpret reality and to act accordingly. When Sir Edward determines to delude himself he 
attempts to artificially conjure up feelings of hatred towards Lady Newenden, feelings which 
have limited or no basis in actual events. As such, Sir Edward, through lying to himself, is 
deep acting. However, his emotional management in this case functions precisely to disable 
the signal function of feeling. Through deep acting, Sir Edward is able to misinterpret the 
event. Ethelinde’s emotional strategies are not only, therefore, more successful in levering 
social profit, they also pose no threat to her ability to make sense of the world. Self-delusion, 
the mis-reading of reality, flies against the bourgeoisie ethos of self-control and prophesises 
danger for the woman foolish enough to become romantically involved with a man marked 
by such weakness. Seen through the lens of Hoschild’s theory, it becomes clear that the 
control of emotions in Ethelinde is not necessarily valorised in the way Hoeveler argues is 
symptomatic of the female gothic tradition. Rather, the careful staging of sensibility is seen as 
a proactive social force, uneasily aligned with both virtuous femininity on the one hand, and 
self-interest on the other, while the repression or summoning of emotions represents an 
inadequate male subjectivity. 
It is through his deep acting that Sir Edward ultimately disqualifies himself as an 
appropriate companionate marriage partner for Ethelinde (or any properly gendered woman), 
within the logic of female authored gothic literature. Sir Edward’s love for Ethelinde means 
he spends considerable sums of the money his wife, Lady Newenden, brought to the marriage 
on Ethelinde, violating the unwritten terms of the marriage contract. Similarly, Sir Edward 
withholds his affection from Lady Newenden and refuses her the role as his emotional 
confidante, instead resorting “for consolation to the mild and reasonable conversation of 
Ethelinde” (23). As a result, the marriage between Sir Edward and Lady Newenden is put 
under immense strain, and Lady Newenden repays Sir Edward by flirting with Lord 
Danesforte, ultimately driving Sir Edward to pursue a divorce. Finally, Lady Newenden 
commits adultery, but there is a strong sense that this is done more out of sheer desperation 
than anything else. In line with the conventions of the sentimental novel, the fallen Lady 
Newenden is purged from the narrative through a “sudden death” (482). 
Seen thus, it becomes clear that Sir Edward cannot fulfil the role of companionate 
husband since he reveals himself capable of harming the lady under his protection. In part, it 
is exactly Sir Edward’s ability to control his emotions, his ability to repress or conjure 
feelings, which make this so. Sir Edward’s ability to deep act is of great service to Ethelinde, 
but it represents a significant threat to any woman joined to him in matrimony. If Ethelinde 
married Sir Edward, what is there to stop a second heroine subjecting Sir Edward to the same 
strategies of sensibility which Ethelinde has pursued with such success, and which resulted in 
the relinquishing of the duties of care to the woman under his protection?  
Sir Edward, however, is nevertheless ultimately presented as a virtuous character. He 
expresses a strong desire to help Ethelinde, he refrains from offending her with a direct 
declaration of his love until his wife is dead and he (incorrectly) believes Montgomery is also 
dead, and he is explicitly contrasted with masculine libertines who seek to exploit rather than 
protect Ethelinde, as well as vulgar middle-class men characterised by the absence of 
sensibility. In these ways, Sir Edward demonstrates, in Hoeveler’s terms, the “feminisation” 
of his identity, thus establishing his virtue.  
 The perception of Sir Edward’s virtue is also strengthened by the corrupt feminine 
sensibility which marks his wife. Indeed, a casual reading of Ethelinde is likely to conclude 
that Lady Newenden deserves what she gets. She is presented throughout as being vain, 
selfish, and – most importantly – lacking in sensibility. For example, when Ethelinde falls 
into lake Grasmere, Lady Newenden “insisted upon fainting; but as nobody seemed disposed 
to attend her, she very prudently contented herself with the appearance of it only” (32). Lady 
Newenden is here precisely aligned with Kramer’s superficial tricksters, women that mimic 
virtuous sensibility to manipulate others. As such, the transference of Sir Edward’s affections 
(i.e., the transference of his financial and social protection) to Ethelinde is seen as entirely 
proper within the generic conventions of sensibility.  
Because of Sir Edward’s ostensible virtue, he cannot be purged from the plot as Lady 
Newenden is. Instead, Sir Edward is subsumed into the female-friendly world in 
spectacularly effective fashion. Despite his “heart being as partial as ever” (506) toward 
Ethelinde, he is cured of all the “painful sensations which had formerly attended that 
partiality” (506). He therefore accepts Ethelinde’s marriage to Montgomery while spending 
much of his time at Grasmere where the married couple live, hoping that his son “might 
become the fortunate husband of the infant cherub whom he saw at... [Ethelinde’s] breast” 
(507). 
Inadequate as a companionate husband, Sir Edward’s dangerous desire is transformed 
into a milder wish to offer support from a distance. Another way of saying this is that Sir 
Edward’s desire has become feminised. We might even suggest that he has been symbolically 
castrated, his masculine sexual feelings (which lead to self-delusion and duelling, dangerous 
tendencies within the logic of sentimentality) thus neutralised. Bereft of masculine sexuality, 
Sir Edward has no wish to pursue a new romantic relationship, ensuring no other woman will 
suffer the consequences of his susceptibility to female sensibility, while his son guarantees 
the future protection of Ethelinde’s own daughter. Within Ethelinde’s reformed world, Sir 
Edward is permitted only to observe the domestic happiness of the object of his 
(desexualized) desire and offer support as required, apparently only too happy to do so. 
Hoeveler points out that the female gothic novel, at times, paints a “cynical and 
sometimes self-critical portrait of what a woman has to do in to survive in patriarchy” (36). In 
Ethelinde, this undercurrent of cynicism becomes very strong, threatening to destabilize the 
conventions of sentimentality through which the text moves. By tacitly drawing attention to 
the manipulative feeling strategies of the heroine, and by representing feminine sensibility as 
complicit in the patriarchal victimization of another woman (Lady Newenden), Smith self-
consciously critiques the genre and the female wish-fulfillment it enacts. 
That Smith was a real and acute victim of patriarchal law has been well documented, 
and I think it is this personal narrative which fissures sensibility in the text so decisively.20 
Forced by a system of laws and conventions to present her sensibility publicly to ensure the 
survival of her family, in Ethelinde Smith seems at once to be advocating playing the victim, 
to be advocating the selling of sensibility, as well as expresses expressing a deep cynicism 
about it. She recognizes it as an effective strategy but, we can speculate, also feels the social 
injustice which makes such a strategy necessary, as well as alluding to the possible collateral 
damage the tactic might produce. Ultimately, however, Smith can offer no alternative method 
of agency for women in Ethelinde. Instead, she pushes the potential of female sensibility to 
its logical extreme in both directions. It is both harmonizing and destructive, sincere but 
manipulative, aligned with the private sphere yet structured by the logic of capitalist 
profiteering.    
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